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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION/
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).
The appellants (Atkinsons) filed a lawsuit against IHC
Hospitals, Inc. (IHC), Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel), and
Scott Olsen (Olsen), claiming inter alia, fraud and
misrepresentations as to a Settlement Agreement which was reached
in connection with injuries apparently sustained by Chad Atkinson.
Atkinsons also sued Stephen G. Morgan (Morgan) and the
law firm of Morgan, Scalley & Reading for legal malpractice.
The lower court granted summary judgment to all
defendants.

The court also denied Atkinsons' motion to file an

Amended Compliant.
This is an appeal from the lower court's granting of
summary judgment to all defendants and denying Atkinsons' Motion
to Amend the Complaint.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

The issue presented for review as to Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc. and its manager Scott Olsen is:
Whether the lower court properly granted summary
judgment to Wetzel and Olsen, dismissing
Atkinson's Complaint.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const. Art. I § 11
Utah Const. Art. I § 24
U.S. Const. Amend XIV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Atkinsons' minor son, Chad Atkinson, suffered
permanent injury while a patient at Primary Children's Medical
Center on or about March 4, 1983.

The Atkinsons entered into a

Settlement Agreement with IHC that was negotiated on IHC's behalf
by Scott Olsen (hereinafter Olsen), manager of Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc.

Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (hereinafter Wetzel)

was retained by IHC to adjust IHC's insurance claims.

The

Atkinsons now claim the settlement was inadequate, and they filed
a complaint on July 26, 1987.
The sections of the Atkinsons' Complaint which apply to
Wetzel and Olsen are Counts I and II. Counts I and II state that
IHC, its claims adjuster Wetzel and Wetzel's employee, Olsen, were
guilty of fraud or negligent misrepresentation because these
respondents allegedly misrepresented Chad's condition in procuring
the settlement agreement.
In Count III the Atkinsons complain that Stephen G.
Morgan and his law firm Morgan, Scalley & Reading are guilty of
legal malpractice.
Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment that IHC must cover
certain institutionalization and therapy costs, and Count V asks
-2-

for a declaration that the Atkinsons could sue other joint
tort-feasors despite a specific prohibition in the settlement
agreement.
All defendants filed motions for summary judgment.

Judge

David Young of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah granted defendants' motions and denied
Atkinsons' motion to amend their complaint to allow a claim for
medical malpractice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Chad Atkinson was born on March 2, 1983.

2.

Roger and Polly Atkinson are the parents and

guardians ad litem of Chad Atkinson.
3.

(R.3)

(R. 2, 20-23)

Plaintiffs Roger and Polly Atkinson sought

appointment as conservators and guardians of Chad Atkinson to
enable them to settle Chad Atkinson's claims against Primary
Children's Medical Center.
4.

(R. 421)

The court-approved appointment of Roger and Polly

Atkinson and approval of the settlement agreement followed at
least five separate meetings directly involving Roger and Polly
Atkinson, Roger's father, a Primary Children's Medical Center
Administrator, and Scott Olsen.
5.

(R. 653 at 31-50)

Scott Olsen (Olsen) is the general manager of Scott

Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel), a company that is an insurance
adjuster for and agent of IHC.
6.

Olsen is also an agent of IHC.

The end result of the negotiations was a complete

financial package covering Chad Atkinson's medical care, education
-3-

and general damages, with additional money going to Roger and
Polly Atkinson for their expenses and time.
7.

(R. 415-418)

Roger and Polly Atkinson, with parental support,

actively participated in negotiating a settlement.

By May 27,

1983 Primary Children's Medical Center had admitted it felt
responsible for Chad's condition.

(R. 4 at 1f 16) Wetzel's

manager, Olsen, on behalf of Primary Children's Medical Center,
made the Atkinsons an offer.
George Atkinson)

(R. 619 - Exhibit 7 to Deposition of

Roger and Polly Atkinson discussed the proposal

with their parents.

(R. 648 at pp. 14-22; R. 649 at pp. 9-11;

R. 646 at pp. 15-57; R. 651 at pp. 6-48)

Roger's father then

assisted Roger and Polly in putting together a ten-page
counter-proposal.

(R. 646-653) After several more meetings, an

agreement was reached.
8.

(R. 415-420)

After the agreement was reached, Olsen contacted

attorney Morgan and requested that Morgan, on behalf of IHC,
present the Settlement Agreement to the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for approval
required under state law in all settlements involving minors.

(R.

156; R.647, p. 116-117; R. 644, p. 112)
9.

Judge Fishier, after questioning Roger and Polly

Atkinson, approved the Settlement Agreement.
10.

(R. 189-196)

The agreement provided that IHC, Primary Children's

Medical Center, and their agents were to be released from claims
arising out of the March 4, 1983 incident wherein Chad had

-4-

undergone oxygen deprivation and suffered brain damage.

The

agreement also stated plainly that Chad's injury might be
permanent.
11.

(R. 415-420).
Prior to the settlement hearing, the Atkinsons had

the agreement read aloud to them by Morgan, and the Atkinsons told
him they understood his explanation.

(R. 652 at pp. 19-28, 30,

38) .
12.

Because the extent of Chad Atkinson's damages was

uncertain, the agreement was based on Roger and Polly Atkinson's
assessment of Chad's condition, not upon any representations made
by defendants.
13.

(R. 415-420)

Roger and Polly Atkinson were invited to have Chad

evaluated by specialists in Phoenix, Arizona at IHC's expense to
determine the exact nature of Chad's injuries.
offer.

They declined the

(R. 646 at p. 50)
14.

Roger and Polly Atkinson were aware before the

settlement was approved by the court that Chad Atkinson had
suffered brain damage.

(R. 203 attached for convenience in

Addendum to this Brief as Transcript of July 22, 1983 Court
Proceeding)
15.

Roger and Polly Atkinson were apprised by the court

at the time the settlement agreement was approved, that entering
into the settlement agreement would prohibit them from suing IHC
or any of its agents if Chad's condition later took a turn for the
worse.

(R. 203, 204)

-5-

16.

Roger and Polly were aware on July 22, 1983 that the

guaranteed payout of the settlement agreement was about $900,000
plus medical expenses, rather than $3 million.

(R. 205, 206)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE COURT-APPROVED RELEASE.
A.

The Release Applies To Scott Wetzel, Inc. And Scott Olsen
As Agents Of IHC.
By signing the court-approved release, plaintiffs agreed

to "forever discharge IHC [and its] agents." According to Utah
law, Wetzel and Olsen are agents of IHC.

In adjusting IHC's

insurance claims, Wetzel and Olsen act in behalf of IHC.
entrusted with the business of IHC.

They are

In addition, IHC as principal

exerts control over the means by which the end result is obtained,
in the form of specific requirements and procedures to which
Wetzel and Olsen must adhere as set out in the employment
contract.

It would be anomalous to release the alleged principal

tortfeasor (IHC) while simultaneously holding its insurance
adjusters liable.

Thus, the release bars claims against Wetzel

and Olsen because they are agents of IHC.
B.

The Undisputed Trial Transcript Documents The Fact That
Plaintiffs Knew Chad Suffered Brain Damage As A Result
Of The March 1983 Incident And Therefore The Release Was
Not Obtained By Fraud Or Misrepresentation.
The release, which was read and signed by the Atkinsons,

states plainly that Chad Atkinson had sustained injury and that
the injury was or might be permanent and progressive.
-6-

The release

also states unequivocally that plaintiffs agreed to release all
future claims against IHC and its agents arising out of the 1983
incident.

Furthermore, the Atkinsons represented the condition of

their child before Judge Fishier as "brain damaged."

In addition,

when the court asked the Atkinsons if they understood that signing
the release would prevent them from bringing more claims against
IHC and its agents, even if Chad's condition worsened, the
Atkinson's responded that they understood.
C. The Court-Approved Release Applies To Plaintiffs' Claims
For Misrepresentation And Fraud And Hence Bars This
Complaint.
Plaintiffs assert that, because theirs is not a medical
malpractice claim, the release does not apply.

Plaintiffs

misconstrue the language of the release by such a narrow
construction.

The release applies to "any and all claims . . . on

account of or in any way growing out of . . . injuries . . .
resulting from the accident."

Plaintiffs' complaint for fraud and

misrepresentation is based upon the condition of Chad Atkinson,
which resulted from the accident in 1983. The release precisely
includes the current complaint.
II.

This action is therefore barred.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE
DEFENDANTS BECAUSE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS BAR
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT.
A.

The Two Year Statute Of Limitations Of The Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act Bars Plaintiffs' Action.
Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and misrepresentation fall

within the definition of "malpractice action against a health care
-7-

provider" in the two-year medical malpractice statute of
limitations because both claims arise out of or are related to the
health care rendered to Chad Atkinson on March 4, 1983.
Plaintiffs were told about Chad's injury on March 4, 1983
and on numerous occasions until the date of the settlement hearing
(July 22, 1983).

They declined to have him tested further.

They

knew or should have known that they suffered a legal injury, but
did not bring suit until July of 1987. That complaint was two
years too late and hence is barred.
B.

The Two Year Statute Of Limitations Applies To Scott
Wetzel, Inc. And Scott Olsen Because They Are Health
Care Providers As Defined In The Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.
The definition of "health care provider" in the Act

includes agents of those rendering health care.
manager Olsen are agents of IHC.

Wetzel and its

In accordance with Utah law,

Wetzel and Olsen have an agency relationship with IHC because IHC
exerts control over the means of obtaining the contracted-for end
result of a settlement.

See Point I.A of this Brief.

In addition,

the Legislature wished to restrict the period and scope of medical
tort claims.

To allow a claim against mere agents of the alleged

principal tortfeasor six years after the fact would contravene the
legislative purpose.
C.

The Three Year Statute Of Limitations Covering Claims
Of Fraud Or Mistake Also Bars Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Assuming arguendo that the claims for misrepresentation

and fraud have some merit, under Utah law the limitations period
-8-

begins to run at the time of discovery of the fraud.

Under the

undisputed facts the Atkinsons' complaint is barred because it was
filed over a year too late.
The transcript of the Court Approval hearing with Judge
Fishier held on July 22, 1983 demonstrates that Polly and Roger
Atkinson knew that Chad had suffered brain damage.

In response to

a specific question, when the court asked what was wrong with
Chad, Polly replied, "Brain damage."
If Wetzel or Olsen ever misrepresented Chad's condition
by indicating that Chad had not sustained brain damage, plaintiffs
would have known this to be untrue by July 22, 1983 (the date of
the settlement hearing).

Plaintiffs should have filed their

complaint on or before July 22, 1986.

They did not file until

July 26, 1987, over a year too late.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL.
The issue of adequate damages was settled by Judge

Fishier's court order stating that the Atkinsons were authorized
to accept the settlement offer and that the settlement was fair.
Plaintiffs now seek to relitigate the adequacy of the settlement.
Their complaint is barred by the application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
A.

All Four Elements Of The Prevailing Test For Applying
The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Are Satisfied.
First, the issue in both actions is identical, i.e.

whether certain damages are sufficient to cover Chad's condition.
-9-

Second, there was a final judgment, in the form of a court order,
regarding the settlement offer and the release contained therein.
Third, Wetzel and Olsen are privies to IHC in the prior action in
which the issue of damages was decided.

Fourth and finally, the

issue of appropriate damages was competently, fully, and fairly
resolved.

Plaintiffs were present in the courtroom after having

participated in extensive negotiations, and engaged in investigative dialogue with the court; therefore, the requirements of
sufficient notice and opportunity to present objections were
fulfilled.

The court found the settlement to be fair "in all

respects."

The issue of adequate damages should not be relitigated.

B.

The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel May Be Applied To
Final Judgments Based On Settlement Agreements.
The law, favoring settlement agreements over litigation,

recognizes that a settlement agreement is final, conclusive, and
as binding as if its terms were embodied in judgment.

Hence,

plaintiffs' unsupported assertion that only issues determined
after a lengthy trial are subject to collateral estoppel is
erroneous.

Consonant with judicial policy towards settlement

agreements, an issue formerly resolved should be barred from
relitigation.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE COURT-APPROVED RELEASE
It is undisputed that plaintiffs negotiated an agreement

with defendant IHC which was approved by the Third Judicial
District Court.

That agreement prohibits this action:

Hereby on their own behalf and on behalf of
their minor child, Chad Atkinson, and their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns
release, acquit and forever discharge Intermountain
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's
Medical Center or their agents, servants,
successors, heirs, executors, administrators, of
and from any and all claims, actions, causes of
actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of
service, expenses and compensation whatsoever,
which the undersigns or their minor child, Chad
Atkinson, now have or which may hereafter acc[ru]e
on account of or in any way growing out of any and
all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen
bodily and personal injuries and property damage in
the consequences thereof resulting or to result
from the accident, casualty or event which occurred
on or about the 4th day of March, 1983, at the
Primary Children's Medical Center. (R. 416)
A. The Release Applies To Scott Wetzel, Inc. And Scott Olsen
As Agents Of IHC.
Plaintiffs agreed to "forever discharge Intermountain
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical Center
or their agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors,
administrators, of and from any and all claims . . .."

Jd-' P-

2

(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs contend that Wetzel and its employee Olsen do
not fall within the scope of the release because they are
independent contractors.

In accordance with the prevailing

standards for differentiating an agent from a non-agent, however,
Wetzel and Olsen are agents of IHC and therefore the release
applies and bars this claim.
An "agent" is one who acts for or in place of another by
authority from him or one who is entrusted with business of
another.

Victorio Realty Group, Inc. v. Ironwood IX, 713 P.2d
-11-

424 (Colo. 1985).

According to Utah law, the crucial distinguish-

ing feature between an agent and a non-agent relationship is the
extent to which the principal (IHC) maintains control over the
performance of the secondary actor.

If the principal controls or

commands only the end result, the secondary actor is deemed an
independent contractor.

If, however, the employer exercises

control over the means of accomplishing the result, the indication
is toward an agent relationship.

See Thiokol Chemical Corporation

v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964).
The manner in which the parties designate a relationship
is not controlling on the issue of whether an agent or independent
contractor relationship has been created; if an act done by one
person on behalf of another is in its essential nature one of
agency, the one is the agent of the other, notwithstanding that he
is not so called.

Chevron Oil Company v. Sutton, 515 P.2d 1283,

1285 (N.M. 1973).

Courts have also recognized that a person may

be both an independent contractor and an agent for another.

See,

e.g. First National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City v.
Sidwell Corporation, 678 P.2d 118, 124 (Kan. 1984).
As defined by these guidelines, Wetzel and Olsen are
agents of IHC.

By mutual assent, IHC mandated in its contract

with Wetzel and Olsen that the latter would adjust IHC's insurance
claims.

The contract states that Wetzel "shall represent and act

for IHC in matters pertaining to the general, professional, and
workers' compensation liabilities of IHC for claims based on
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events which occur during the term or terms of this Agreement."
(See Addendum to this Brief.)
Pursuant to this directive, IHC set up numerous and
specific duties for which Wetzel is responsible.

Those duties

include: creating files for and investigating the validity of all
claims, determining proper benefits due, making payments, defending
non-compensable claims, and filing appropriate information to
government agencies. At all times Wetzel acts in place of IHC, or
in its behalf, not simply as an independent actor who may construct
a project as he pleases so long as the end result is obtained.
In addition, IHC maintains a significant amount of
control over Wetzel's activity.

As stipulated in the contract,

Wetzel must make "timely payment of benefits due in accord with
payment procedures established. . .by IHC."

IHC provides and

controls all the money utilized to settle claims.

Wetzel must

"assist selected (by IHC) legal counsel in preparation of cases
for hearings, appeals, and/or trial." Wetzel must provide
pertinent data on all claims to IHC; it also must provide loss
reports in a tailored format.

Finally, Wetzel must "provide . . .

IHC such reports as (IHC) may reasonably require."

(Emphasis

added) (See Addendum to this Brief.)
These well-defined duties of Wetzel to a substantially
involved IHC demonstrate that, for the purpose of the release
which bars this claim, Wetzel and Olsen are agents of IHC.
Although plaintiffs allege that Wetzel and Olsen are
independent contractors, and hence not included in the release,
-13-

there are three countervailing considerations which refute
plaintiffs' argument.

First, it would be anomalous to release the

alleged principal tortfeasor (in this case, IHC) from claims
arising out of the March 1983 incident while simultaneously
holding a mere insurance adjuster liable.

Second, even if the

parties themselves designate the relationship as one of
independent contracor, this designation is not controlling.
Chevron Oil Company, supra.

See

What is important is the extent to

which IHC controls Wetzel's activity, and as pointed out above,
there is specific and continous oversight on the part of IHC.
Third, given that an independent contractor may also be an agent
(see First National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma, supra),
and taking into account the fact that IHC controls all the money
and many of the settlement procedures, it is reasonable to
conclude that the release intended to include all types of
affiliated, secondary actors in the March 1983 incident.
Therefore, this claim against Wetzel and Olsen is barred.
B.

The Undisputed Hearing Transcript Documents The Fact
That Plaintiffs Knew Chad Suffered Brain Damage As
A Result Of The Incident In March Of 1983, And
Therefore The Release Was Not Obtained By Fraud.
In an attempt to escape the plain language of the

release, plaintiffs allege on appeal that Wetzel and Olsen
misrepresented the seriousness of Chad's condition.

Plaintiffs

assert these misrepresentations caused them to settle the claim.

-14-

The undisputed facts, however, demonstrate that the
Atkinsons knew their child had sustained brain damage.

Contained

in the Court Transcript of Hearing, July 22, 1983 is the following:
THE COURT:

Do you believe you have a claim
against Intermountain Health Care?

MRS. ATKINSON:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

What's the nature of the child's
injury?
Brain damage.

MRS. ATKINSON:

* * * * * * *

THE COURT:

Do you believe that you, on behalf of
the child, have a claim against
Intermountain Health Care?

MR. ATKINSON:
Pages 2-4.

Yes, I do.

(A copy of the transcript is provided for the

convenience of this Court at Addendum to this Brief.)
The other facts show how plaintiffs gained this
understanding.

The following is taken from Deposition of

Dr. Michael Matlak:
A:

I can remember taking to Dad [Roger
Atkinson] on the telephone after Chad had
his episode of near cardiac arrest . . .

Q:

What did you tell Mr. Atkinson?

A:

I told him that his child's breathing tube
had become plugged and with that that Chad
had a life threatening condition because of
the fact that we were having trouble
breathing for him and that his heart rate
had slowed down and that we were concerned
that he had a lack of oxygen during that
period of time . . . (p. 19)
* * * * * * * *
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Okay, could you tell me about another
conversation that you specifically recall?
I think I can recall that when Mr. Atkinson
came over with either his mother or his
mother-in-law that at the bedside we talked
about Chad's condition.
And what did you tell her?
I told them what I just told you when you
asked about the March 3rd or March 4th episode
What did Mr. Atkinson say?
I don't recall . . . other than remembering
that they were upset and concerned about the
condition of their child. (p. 20)
* * * * * * * * *

Did you ever in any conversation with Chad's
family members understate the severity of his
condition or in any way withhold information
from them?
Not at all.

(p. 63)

* * * * * * * * *

om Deposition of Dr. Joel Thompson:
At this conversation [with the Atkinsons prior
to Chad's discharge from the hospital] did you
tell Roger and Polly that the child had brain
damage?
I indicated there was brain damage and that
the problems that he had, the seizures and so
forth were the result of the brain not working
the way it should. (p. 11)
Did you tell Roger and Polly that the brain
damage could be permanent?
Yes. (p. 12)
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Q:

To the best of your knowledge have you ever at
any time understated in conversations with any
of the Atkinson family members Chad's
condition or prospects of ultimate outcome?

A:

No, sir.

(p. 37)

In addition to knowing the bare fact that Chad had
suffered brain damage, plaintiffs also knew that the injury might
be permanent and severe.

The uncontested content of the release,

which the Atkinsons read, had explained to them, and signed,
states:
The undersigneds hereby declare and represent
that the injuries sustained by Chad Atkinson are or
may be permanent and progressive and that recovery
therefrom is uncertain and indefinite . . . (R. 417)
Furthermore, it is undisputed that the court clarified and
questioned plaintiffs about the issue:
THE COURT:

Do you understand that by settling
this case, and regardless of what
later transpires, when you find out
later that the child's injury is
worse than you anticipated, and on
the other hand even if it's better,
that you will not ever be able to
come back against Intermountain
Health Care? Do you understand that?

MRS. ATKINSON:

Yes, sir, I do.

Transcript at p. 2 (see Addendum to this Brief).
Plaintiffs represented to the Court, and signed documents
to the effect that they understood both that Chad was brain
damaged and that the injury might be permanent and progressive.
In addition to paying for all medical expenses, both past and
future, IHC agreed to pay plaintiffs nearly a million dollars over
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the course of Chad Atkinson's life.

In return plaintiffs agreed

to release all claims against IHC and its agents.

The trial court

correctly upheld the release and correctly granted summary
judgment for the defendants Wetzel and Olsen.
C.

The Court-Approved Release Applies to Plaintiffs'
Claims for Misrepresentation and Fraud and Hence
Bars this Complaint.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the plain language of the

release by asserting that, because theirs is not a medical
malpractice claim, the release does not apply.

The language of

the court-approved, signed release, however, is not limited to
medical malpractice actions:
[The undersigneds Polly and Roger Atkinson, on
behalf of their minor child, do hereby] acquit
and forever discharge Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., . . . or their agents . . . of and from any
and all claims, actions, causes of action,
demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service,
expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the
undersigneds or their minor child, Chad Atkinson,
now have or which may hereafter accrue on account
of or in any way growing out of any and all known
and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and
personal injuries and property damage and the
consequences thereof resulting or to result from
the accident, casualty or event which occurred on
or about the 4th day of March, 1983, at the
Primary Children's Medical Center. (emphasis
added)
(R. 416) The plaintiffs' complaint for fraud and misrepresentation is based upon the allegation that Chad's condition was worse
than it appeared; that Olsen (among other defendants) knew or
should have known this fact, and hence that plaintiffs now deserve

-18-

further compensation for Chad's injury.
current claim.

The release prohibits the

Plaintiffs' action is a simple example of

precisely that which the release intended to bar:

further

recovery based on claims arising out of or resulting from the
March 1983 incident.

The plaintiffs' entire case in Counts I and

II is based upon the condition of Chad Atkinson which resulted
from the accident in 1983. As such, the release applies.
Summary judgment, granted because the uncontested facts
demonstrate that the court-approved release bars plaintiffs'
complaint, should be upheld.
II,

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE
DEFENDANTS BECAUSE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION BAR
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT.
A.

The Two Year Statute of Limitations Of The Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act Bars Plaintiffs' Action.
Plaintiffs' complaint against Wetzel and Olsen is barred

by U.C.A. § 78-14-4, which states in pertinent part:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, . . .
Plaintiffs' claims for fraud (Count I) and negligent
misrepresentation (Count II) fall within the definition of
"malpractice action against a health care provider" as set out in
§ 78-14-3 U.C.A.:
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(29) "Malpractice action against a health
care provider" means any action against a health
care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach
of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or
arising out of health care rendered or which
should have been rendered by the health care
provider. (emphasis supplied)
The plain language of the statute includes plaintiffs'
alleged claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

First,

the claim of fraud is based upon the allegation that Wetzel and
Olsen intentionally concealed the condition of Chad Atkinson.

The

condition of Chad Atkinson arose from the health care rendered to
him in March of 1983; therefore the claim for fraud falls within
the scope of the statute.

Second, all claims of negligent

misrepresentation regarding the condition of Chad are also
included in the statute's definition because those claims, in an
identical fashion, relate to or arise from health care rendered on
March 4, 1983.

Therefore, both the fraud and misrepresentation

claims, which turn upon Chad's condition after the alleged
malpractice, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations
because both directly relate to or arise out of the incident that
occurred on March 4, 1983.
In addition, the legislature evidenced intent to include
fraud by delineating an additionally limiting time period of one
year during which plaintiffs must file all claims seeking damages
for fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice.
§ 78-14-4(l)(b>]

-20-

[U.C.A.

Whether the one-or-two-year period of limitations is
applied, the Utah standard governing what commences the running of
the statute is the same:

The statute begins to run when an

injured person knows or should know that he has suffered a legal
injury.

Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

Further,

when a plaintiff is aware of facts that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that he may have a cause of action against a
health care provider, the statute of limitations begins to run.
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 801 F.2d 368.

The reasonable awareness threshold

which starts the statute of limitations running also applies to
actions on behalf of minors, where the party seeking a cause of
action does so as guardian ad litem.

Hargett v. Limberg, supra.

Polly and Roger Atkinson were notified about the incident
that occurred on March 4, 1983.

(R. 645 at pp. 19, 20, 63; R 650

at pp. 11, 12) The doctors, and Olsen, told the plaintiffs that
their child had suffered oxygen deprivation from a blocked
breathing tube and brain damage.

Most importantly, at the time of

the hearing, the court informed Polly and Roger Atkinson about the
value of the settlement and Chad's condition, and they responded
that they understood.

(R. 203-208)

It is also undisputed that

Olsen offered to pay for additional tests for Chad before the
settlement agreement was drawn up, but the plaintiffs declined the
offer.

(R. 646 at p. 50)
Plaintiffs knew their child had suffered oxygen

deprivation.

They knew that the doctors and Olsen had told them
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of Chad's brain damage.

In fact, the Atkinsons even apprised the

Court about their child's injury; Polly Atkinson informed the
court that her child was "Brain-damaged."

By all standards of

reasonability, if a claim such as the present one existed,
plaintiffs knew or should have known at that time
(March 4-July 22, 1983).
Plaintiffs did not file this suit until July 26, 1987,
far too late for either the one-or two-year limitations period set
out in the Utah Malpractice Act.
B.

The Two Year Statute of Limitations Applies To Scott
Wetzel, Inc., And Scott Olsen Because They Are Health
Care Providers As Defined In The Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.
The term "health care provider" is defined in Utah Health

Care Malpractice Act:
As used in this act:
(1) "Health care provider" includes any
person, partnership, association, corporation, or
other facility or institution who causes to be
rendered or who renders health care or
professional services as a hospital, . . . and
others rendering similar care and services
relating to or arising out of the health needs of
persons or groups of persons, and officers,
employees, or agents of any of the above acting
in the course and scope of their employment.
§ 78-14-3, Utah Code Annotated (emphasis supplied).

Pursuant to

an employment contract and according to Utah law, Wetzel and Scott
Olsen are agents of defendant IHC.

See I.A of this Brief.

In addition, plaintiffs' allegation that the two-year
statute of limitations does not apply to Wetzel and Olsen produces
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anomalous results and contravenes the stated legislative purpose
of the Act.

By enacting a two-year statute of limitations, the

legislature wished to make the time in which claims could be
brought reasonable but predictably limited to a specific period.
(§ 78-14-2 Utah Code Ann.).

It also wished to encourage early

settlement and to counteract skyrocketing insurance rates. Jd.
Plaintiffs argue, in effect, that although claims against IHC may
be barred by the two-year statute of limitations, its mere agents
are not so protected.

In so contending, plaintiffs emasculate the

very purpose of the statute and unreasonably broaden its scope.
Just as claims against IHC are barred, so are those against Wetzel
and 01sen.
C.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act And Its Statute
Of Limitations Are Constitutionally Sound.
Appellants claim that application of the two-year medical

malpractice statute of limitations to the Atkinson's claim would
deprive minor Chad of his constitutional right to an open court
and to equal treatment and protection under the law.

A review of

pertinent case law will show that Utah courts which have tested
the constitutionality of the Act under the theories raised by
appellants have rejected the same constitutional arguments which
appellants now assert.
In reaching its decision to uphold Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-14-4, the Court can rely on a long line of Utah Supreme Court
decisions which have strongly and consistently upheld the
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provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act, including its
statute of limitations, against constitutional challenges. See,
e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah
1981); Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah
1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786
(Utah 1979); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978).
Federal courts reviewing constitutional challenges to the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act have also uniformly upheld the
validity of § 78-14-4.

See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600

(10th Cir. 1983).
This Court's decision in Allen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., supra, is typical of the support the Court has given
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical
malpractice.

In Allen the Court unanimously rejected the

plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations for
medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guarantees of
equal protection.

The Court held that:

(1) the Utah "legislature

exercised its discretionary prerogative in determining that the
shortening of the statute of limitations . . . would insure the
continued availability of health care services,"; and (2) such
action does not exceed constitutional prohibitions.

635 P.2d at

32 (footnote omitted).
Appellants implicitly acknowledge that the Legislature
may rationally limit the time for filing malpractice claims as to
adults, but argue it may not so limit minors' claims. Appellants'
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argument overlooks, however, the principle that the legislature
may place minors on equal footing with adults without infringing
their constitutional rights.

As explained in Vance v. Vance, 108

U.S. 514 (1883):
The Constitution of the United States . . . gives
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it
is within the legislative competency of the State
. . . to make exceptions in their favor or not.
The exemptions from the operation of statutes of
limitation, usually accorded to infants and
married women, do not rest upon any general
doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected
to their action, but in every instance upon
express language in those statutes giving them
time after majority . . . to assert their rights.
Id. at 521.

See also Grellet v. City of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d

671, 673 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986) (medical malpractice action not tolled
by plaintiff's infancy); Licano v. Karusnick, 663 P.2d 1066, 1068
(Colo. App. 1983) (the legislature is the primary judge of whether
the time period allowed to a minor is reasonable); Rohrabaugh v.
Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 1980) (legislature is not under
any constitutional mandate to suspend operation of statutes of
limitation in cases of infancy or incapacity); 51 AM.JUR.2d 750,
Limitation of Actions § 182 (1970) (minority does not per se
bestow immunity upon an infant or his guardian without a
legislative saving in his favor, and a statute of limitations will
ordinarily run against the claims of infants in the absence of a
contrary statute).
This principle was reaffirmed by the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Harqett
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v. Limberq, supra.

In that decision the federal court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant health care providers,
holding that the minor plaintiff's claim was barred by the medical
malpractice statute of limitations.

In doing so the court

considered and rejected the same constitutional attack the
appellants have launched in their brief.

The court's opinion

recognizes as "universally accepted" the rule that a "legislature
may put adults and infants on the same footing with respect to
statutes of limitation without affecting constitutional rights."
Id. at 156.
Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion
with respect to operation of the statute of limitations against
minors' claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

See, e.g.,

Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1980) ("It
is well established that a claimant's minority does not toll the
running of the statute of limitations under the Federal Tort
Claims Act"); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir.
1965) (minority does not toll the statute of limitations, and
parents or guardians of a minor must preserve a claim by timely
action); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir.),
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (equal protection guarantees are
not violated by applying a shortened statute of limitations to a
minor * s claim).
Sound state and federal case precedents clearly show that
the statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
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Act, which places adults and minors on equal footing, is a
constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a rational
response to the stated legislative purpose of addressing a crisis
in the availability of medical malpractice insurance and its
attendant effect upon the quality of health care in the State of
Utah.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977).

D.

Section 78-14-4 Is A Constitutionally Permissible
Enactment.
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on

constitutional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof.

Judicial

review of a properly enacted law begins with the strong presumption
that the law is constitutional.
1222 (Utah 1983).

State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220,

This Court has consistently observed that it is

not the function of the judiciary to second guess the wisdom of
legislation.
But the wisdom or propriety of the legislation is
not for us to consider . . . "there is, without
doubt, plenty of room, within the pale of the
Constitution, for ill-advised legislation. . . .
That is a matter between the people and the
representatives." . . . Within the limits of the
Constitution it is the prerogative of the
legislature to control such matters, and the fact
that an act may be ill-advised or unfortunate, if
such it be, does not give rise to an appeal from
the Legislature to the courts for correction
. . . that each branch thereof avoid
infringement upon the prerogatives of the other.
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin., 246 P.2d
591, 599 (Utah 1952) [citations omitted]; see also Minnesota v.
Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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By judicial mandate

this court must not interfere with the Legislature's exercise of
its prerogative unless a constitutional infringement is clearly
established.
1.

Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981).
Standard of Review.

Appellants' challenge the constitutionality of § 78-14-4
as applied to minors on two grounds:

(1) the provision violates

guarantees of equal protection of laws found within the United
States and Utah Constitutions; and (2) the provision violates
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution relating to a
litigant's right of access to the courts.

In concurrence with

plaintiffs' brief on this issue, the rational basis standard of
review is the appropriate standard for deciding both of
appellants' constitutional challenges.

See Malan v. Lewis, 693

P.2d 661, 674 (Utah 1984) (equal protection rational basis
analysis applies to review of rights guaranteed by Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution).
A statute may treat groups differently and still meet
constitutional equal protection and access to the courts requirements if:

(1) the law applies equally to all persons within a

class; and (2) the statutory classifications and different
treatment given the classes have a reasonable tendency to further
the objectives of the statute.
2.

See Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 670.

Access to Courts.

Appellants have additionally challenged the statute of
limitations under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
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These respondents do not believe, however, that the appellants'
open court argument is applicable to the facts of this case.
In essence, appellants' arguments simply speaks to the
general question of whether there is denial of access to court
when there is discovery of an injury after a statute of
limitations has run, or when a minor does not have a parent or
guardian willing or able to bring an action on his behalf.
Appellant has avoided the application of the cited law to the
facts in this case.

This case is distinguishable from Berry v.

Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), since in this case
there was discovery several years before the statute ran and
parents were willing to, and in fact did, assert the minor child's
claim.
Appellants have argued that the status of "minority"
deprives minors access to court.

It is true that in injury cases

involving minors, the claim will have to be brought on the child's
behalf by his parent or guardian.

However, it is not inequitable

or improper to place some responsibility on parents or guardians
to protect and preserve a minor's claim for an injury that
accompanies a failure to diagnose or treat. After all, parents
make daily choices during a child's minority which certainly
affect the child's future.

Parents choose, on the minor's behalf,

the extent of medical intervention and treatment of a child's
illnesses.

The Utah Legislature recognized this responsibility by

enacting § 78-14-4.
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3.

Application of Standard of Review.

The statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, section 78-14-4, must be held to be a
constitutional exercise of the Utah Legislature's prerogative
unless appellants can clearly establish that the statute does not
meet the two-part test of the rational basis standard of review.
To meet that test the statute must, first, apply equally to all
members of the created class. Malan v. Lewis, supra.

The class

created and protected by the Act is health care providers.

See

Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra at 31 ("The test
. . . is whether there exists a rational basis to treat health
care providers differently from other alleged tortfeasors
. . . .").

Section 78-14-4 applies equally to all health care

providers and therefore complies with the first prong of the
rational basis test.

The statute also treats equally the affected

group, i.e., those persons including minors who have personal
injury claims against health care providers.
Second, to pass equal protection review the different
treatment afforded the protected class must have a "reasonable
tendency" to further the legislative objective. Malan v. Lewis,
supra at 670.
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, the
Utah Supreme Court reviewed the legislative objective behind the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in upholding the Act and its
statute of limitations against constitutional challenges.
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It is therefore seen that the Act was
premised upon the need to protect and insure the
continued availability of health care services to
the public, and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to
shield insurance companies from legitimate claims.
The legislature exercised its discretionary
prerogative in determining that the shortening of
the statute of limitations (along with requiring
notice of intention to sue), would insure the
continued availability of adequate health care
services.
635 P.2d at 32; X see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977).
The Legislature properly recognized the need to treat
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort
actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limitations.

Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice

case would create an insurmountable problem of trying to determine
the applicable standard of care long after the treatment and
injury occur.

Advances in knowledge and technology occur so

rapidly in medicine that state-of-the-art treatment today is
likely to be considered substandard in the very near future.

It

is unreasonable to assume that a court or jury can determine the
applicable standard of care with any degree of fairness ten or
fifteen years after the fact.

It would be impossible for jurors

to fairly assess the physician's actions based upon an ancient
standard of care without taking into account their personal knowledge of advances which have occurred during the ensuing decades
which make older techniques of treatment seem inappropriate.

lr

Ihe Allen decision is cited by the court in Malan v. Lewis as
supporting for the second prong of the equal protection — rational
basis test. 693 P.2d at 670.
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These practical problems of presenting a case more than six
years old are compounded in this case since Chad is not only a minor
but a mental incompetent.

Even after Chad reaches majority he will

still be unable and legally incompetent to make decisions concerning
his own legal rights.

He will remain unable to initiate legal

proceedings in his own behalf.

If one accepts appellants' argument

that the statute of limitations should be tolled until an injured
minor is competent to bring an action on his own behalf, the statute
of limitations for a medical malpractice claim for Chad and others
similarly situated may never commence to run, and an action on their
behalf could be instituted decades after the cause of action
arises.

The potential liability of a health care provider and the

exposure of his liability insurer in that situation becomes
indefinite; the setting of insurance rates and reserves becomes an
exercise in futility.

It was the spectre of this unjust burden

which led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude:
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent
persons from the generally tolling provisions
[Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36] is rationally related
to the stated purpose of containing the
malpractice insurance crisis. That rationality
is particularly evidenced by the facts of the
present case. Serious permanent injuries to
children are often cases of large potential
damages. If the period in which such claims
could be brought were tolled until the young
child reached the age of majority, a heavy burden
would be placed on insurance carriers in
evaluating and defending against the claim,
establishing appropriate reserve requirements,
and setting rates. The percentage of medical
malpractice claims brought by minors is far from
insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty
inherent in tolling the period in which such
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claims may be brought could drastically affect
insurance rates of at least this segment of
health care providers that provide services
exclusively to minors.
Harqett v. Limberg, supra at 158.
The federal court further stated that the burden of
weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and
thereby to ensure the availability of health care services against
the competing interests of minors and mental incompetents whose
parents or guardians fail to timely initiate an action is a
problem to be handled by the legislature, not the courts.

Id.

The reasons for leaving the balancing process to the legislature
are important:
Furthermore, any possible harm that may be
suffered by a minor whose parents or guardians
fail to initiate the action against a potential
tortious wrongdoer within the appropriate time
period may be outweighed by the chaos,
uncertainty, and severe prejudice which will occur
to those accused of tortious conduct, their
insurance carriers, and ultimately to the
insurance carriers' rate payers when lawsuits are
permitted to be initiated decades after the
occurrence of the incident giving rise thereto.
Before such a sweeping change is made the question
of "reserve requirements" imposed on insurance
carriers and the resulting effect on insurance
rates as well as many other issues must be
addressed. The Legislature, not the courts, is
the proper forum for the resolution of such issues.
De Santis v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (Pa. 1981).
Based upon the authorities cited above, appropriate
principles of judicial review, and the legislative objectives
behind the enactment of the Act and its statute of limitations, it
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is clear that §

78-14-4 complies with state as well as federal

guarantees of equal protection of laws and does not deny these
appellants access to the courts.

Other jurisdictions which have

analyzed equal protection and due process attacks by minor
plaintiffs against medical malpractice statutes of limitations
have reached similar results.

See, e.g., Donabedian v. Manzer,

153 Cal. 3d 592 (1984); Kite v. Campbell, 14 Cal. 3d 793 (1983)
(statute providing that medical malpractice action by a minor must
be commenced within limitations and was properly dismissed);
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980)
(time limitation affecting medical malpractice claim for death of
a minor child was not contrary to due process and equal
protection); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, supra (Ind. 1980) (court held
that the legislature was not constitutionally mandated to suspend
application of statutes of limitation in cases of infancy or
incapacity and dismissed appeal which challenged constitutionality of statute of limitations of medical malpractice act).
E.

The Three Year Statute Of Limitations Covering Claims Of
Fraud Or Mistake Also Bars Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Plaintiffs' action is also barred by § 78-12-26(3) of the

Utah Code Ann.:
Within three years: (3) an action for relief on
the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the
cause of action in such case does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting the fraud or mistake,
(emphasis added)
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The statute of limitations for actions for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake bars this action.

Such actions must be

brought within three years from the date the fraud or mistake is
discovered.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), supra.

Further, the

statute of limitations begins to run when a party has been
informed of such facts as will put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry.
1916).

Gibson v. Jensen, 158 P. 426 (Utah

Finally, the statute bars both actions for fraud (Count I)

and actions for negligent misrepresentation (Count II). See, e.g.
Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Co., 65 P. 208 (Utah 1901).
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Wetzel, through its
employee Olsen, either intentionally or negligently misrepresented
information about Chad's condition just prior to and up to the
time of settlement.

This allegation also goes to the heart of

plaintiffs' complaint, which is that the settlement value was
inadequate, and that the Atkinsons accepted the inadequate amount
based upon their misunderstanding of Chad's condition.
Assuming for purposes of argument that Olsen misrepresented Chad's condition as not serious in order to induce them to
settle, the crucial issue turns upon when plaintiffs learned that
their child was brain damaged (i.e. the discovery of the fraud or
misrepresentation).

The latest date is July 22, 1983, when the

court interviewed Roger and Polly Atkinson:
THE COURT:

What is the nature of the child's injury?

MRS. ATKINSON:

Brain damage.

(R. 203)
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In addition, the release, which plaintiffs signed shortly
after the above statement was made, also states in unequivocal
language that Chad Atkinson sustained injury and that such injury
was or might be permanent and progressive.

(R. 417)

The Atkinsons knew they were getting nearly a million
dollars because Chad was brain damaged.

Further, when asked, Polly

Atkinson could not produce any facts to demonstrate that defendant
Wetzel or Olsen concealed anything.

(R. 647 at p. 108)

Finally,

when defendant Olsen told Roger Atkinson and his father that they
(plaintiffs) could get a lawyer, Roger's father indicated that they
had seen a lawyer and they "didn't want to go to all the trouble."
(R. 653 at p. 49)

Plaintiffs also refused Olsen's offer to pay for

additional testing for Chad.

(R. 646 at p. 50)

In accordance with Utah precedent, at the very latest
plaintiffs admittedly had knowledge of the nature of the injury by
the date of the hearing on July 22, 1983.

They even refused to find

out more about Chad's condition, to the extent that such knowledge
was obtainable, by refusing the offer to have Chad tested further.
Plaintiffs also disregarded the opportunity to get their own lawyer
and hence to delve further into the settlement arrangement.
The statute of limitations began to run on July 22, 1983.
On that date both plaintiffs stated to the court that they
understood both that Chad was brain damaged and that they would
receive $900,000 from defendant IHC.

Plaintiffs filed their

complaint on July 26, 1987 a year and four days too late.
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This action is barred either by the two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations, under which Scott Wetzel and its
employee Olsen are health care providers, or by the three year
period for actions claiming fraud or mistake.

Justice would be well

served, and legislative intent effectively upheld, if this Court
sustains the lower Court's grant of defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL.
In July of 1983, Roger, Polly, and Chad Atkinson, as well
as Intermountain Health Care, went before the Third Judicial
District Court for the County of Salt Lake for court approval of
the settlement agreement.

That court determined that the

plaintiffs were satisfied with the agreement, and it approved the
settlement.

Six years later, the same parties are trying to

resurrect the same issues before this Court.
seek money damages for Chad's condition.

Plaintiffs' again

This action against

Wetzel and Olsen is barred by the principle of collateral estoppel
because the defendants, as agents, are in privity with the
defendant IHC in the original matter, and because the same issue
is involved.
A.

All Four Elements Of The Prevailing Test For Applying
The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Are Satisfied.
Collateral estoppel prevents parties or their privies

from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were
-37-

fully resolved in the first suit.
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978).

Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588

A four part test is used to determine

the applicability of the doctrine:
1.

Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?

2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3.

Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?

4.

Was the issue in the first case competently,
fully, and fairly litigated?

Id. at 691.
This action against Wetzel and Olsen clearly satisfies
all four tests, and hence is barred by the principle of collateral
estoppel.
First, the issue in the prior action was decided and is
identical to that which is being litigated in the present action.
The issue was then, and is now, whether certain damages are
adequate to cover Chad's condition.

Further, an issue is

"decided" if it was "essential to the resolution of the first
suit."

See Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).

Although the hearing was not an extensive trial, a final court
order was issued after Judge Fishier questioned both plaintiffs.
Final orders which determine the rights of parties (as did the
Court's approval of a settlement agreement which released IHC and
its agents and fixed an award amount) are sometimes included
within the scope of "judgment."

Brown v. Tubbs, 582 P.2d 1165
-38-

(Kan. App. 1978).

The major purpose of the prior court evaluation

and appraisal of the settlement agreement was to determine whether
the financial payments sufficiently compensated plaintiffs for
Chad's condition.
Second, there was a final judgment.

After asking

questions of Roger and Polly Atkinson, the court specifically
ordered the parents, as conservators, were authorized to accept
the settlement offer as set forth in their petition.

In addition,

the court ordered all claims by Chad Atkinson against
Intermountain Health Care could be released.

(R. 423)

Third, Wetzel and Olsen are privies to IHC in the prior
action.

The legal definition of a person in privity with another,

is a person so identified in interest with another that he
represents the same legal right.

Searle Bros., supra at 691. Not

only are agents Wetzel and Olsen "identified in interest" with IHC
in this case, the three parties had, and have, identical
interests, viz. that the court's approval of the settlement
agreement be obtained, and once obtained, upheld.
Fourth, and finally, the issue of appropriate damages was
competently, fully and fairly resolved.

The fourth element is

satisfied if the parties "receive notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances to apprise them of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."

Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah App. 1987).

Plaintiffs were actually present in the courtroom.

The court

asked them numerous questions involving their knowledge of and
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feeling about the crucial issue of whether the settlement was
fair.

(R. 203-208)

In addition, the court after due

investigation found the settlement agreement to be fair in all
respects.

(R. 426, "said settlement in all respects is fair").

The four requirements for the application of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel to the issue of adequate damages are
satisifed.
B.

The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel May Be Applied
To Final Judgments Based On Settlement Agreements.
Plaintiffs' contention that the lack of the fullblown

trial precludes application of collateral estoppel is erroneous.
The "actually litigated" standard upon which plaintiffs relies
really serves to distinguish collateral estoppel (where the issue
must actually have been brought up to be estopped) from res
judicata (where even claims that are not discussed at all may be
merged or barred).

Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the

"actually litigated" standard does not stand for the proposition
that only issues determined after a lengthy trial are barred; if
that were the case, compromises and settlements would be useless,
which is simply not the policy of the law.

The law favors the

resolution of controversies and uncertainties through compromise
and settlement rather than through litigation.

See, e.g., Fieser

v. Stinnett, 509 P.2d 1156 (Kan. 1973).
In concert with the law's favorable opinion of settlement
agreements, there exists a specific caveat that a settlement
assented to by all parties in interest is ordinarily final,
-40-

conclusive, and is binding upon them as contract and as if terms
were embodied in judgment.

Theis v. Theis, 135 N.W.2d 740, 744

(Minn. 1965) (emphasis supplied).

See also Corbett v. Combined

Communications Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 654 P.2d 616 (Okla. 1982)
(holding that an executed agreement of settlement is as conclusive
against a party seeking to avoid it as the final judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction).

Finally, Utah courts apply the

doctrine of collateral estoppel to an issue formerly dispensed
with in a final judgment even if, as plaintiffs' alleges, claims
for relief are different in the two actions.

See Penrod v. NU

Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983).
In this case the settlement was approved by the Court on
July 22, 1983. Plaintiffs were before the Court, responded to
questions by the Court relating to the settlement, and fully
consented to the settlement agreement.

Plaintiffs had also

participated in extensive negotiations prior to settlement and
attended numerous meetings with representatives of IHC, including
Olsen.

Application of collateral estoppel to the issue of

sufficient damages requires that there be notice to plaintiffs and
opportunity to be heard.
satisfied.

These requirements were fully

The issue of damages is therefore barred and

plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate it.
CONCLUSION
This action is barred by a court-approved release.
release was read aloud to plaintiffs, was signed by them, and
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The

plaintiffs represented that they understood that Chad's injury
might be permanent and progressive, and that if Chad's condition
worsened they could not bring any claim against IHC or its
agents.

The release, for which consideration of nearly a million

dollars plus the payment of future medical expenses was given,
expressly bars any and all claims resulting from the March 1983
incident.

Plaintiffs should not be allowed to simply disregard

the terms of the contract, especially since they have chosen not
to rescind it and instead have retained its benefits.
As agents of IHC, the complaint against Wetzel and its
employee Olsen is also barred by either the two- or three-year
statute of limitations.

On July 22, 1983 these plaintiffs

testified before the court that they knew their child had brain
damage.

They refused defendants' offer for further testing.

This

action, which turns upon Chad's condition as a result of an
accident in March 1983, is barred by the application of either the
medical malpractice statute of limitations or the fraud and deceit
statute of limitations.
Finally, plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate
the crucial and identical issue in both cases regarding what
amount of damages was sufficient to compensate the Atkinsons for
Chad's injury.

The issue of appropriate damages for Chad's

condition as a result of the March 1983 accident has been fully
and fairly decided by a court order declaring the settlement to be
fair and bestowing upon the plaintiffs the authority to accept the
July 1983 settlement.

Extensive negotiations and discussions
-42-

about the issue of appropriate damages went on between plaintiffs
and defendants prior to the conservatorship hearing.

At that

hearing, all parties agreed to settle on a certain amount.
Plaintiffs now seek additional damages for Chad's condition.
Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of this issue.
Despite plaintiff's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, there is no material dispute.

The uncontested facts

demonstrate that plaintiffs knew Chad's condition; they knew the
value of the settlement; they knew they were barred from further
claims against defendants; they participated in extensive
negotiations with defendants and even offered a counter-proposal
drafted by Roger Atkinson's father; and finally, plaintiffs
refused defendants offer to pay for further testing.

As a matter

of law, the present complaint is barred by application of any one
of three doctrines.

Accordingly, the lower court's summary

judgment for defendants should be upheld.
DATED this

I

day of August, 1989.

ml—

RAY, Q^JIWEY & NEfeEKER

Attorneys for Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen

0054C
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ADDENDUM

TRANSCRIPT OF JULY 22, 1983 COURT HEARING

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISKLER, JUDGE PRESIDING
oOo

6
7

IN THE MATTER OF
Case No. P-83-692
CHAD ATKINSON,

B

SETTLEMENT
A Minor.

9
10
11

Friday, July 22, 1983
12
13
U

APPEARANCES:
15
16
17

For Intermountain
Health Care

STEPHEN G. MORGAN, ESQ.
MORGAN, STANLEY, & READ."
261 East, 300 South, *2C
Brigham City, Utah 8411:
Phone: (801) 531-7870

IB
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

SHARYN KELLY, CSR #134
Official Reporter

\

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH;

FRIDAY, JULY 2 2 , 1983;

9:30 A.M.

-o0o~

2
3
A

5

THE COURT:

This is P-83-692, In the Matter of Chad
/

Atkinson, a Minor.

6

MR. MORGAN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MRS. ATKINSON:

9

(Polly Atkinson and Roger W. Atkinson were duly sworn.)

10
11

THE COURT:

Steven Morgan representing them.
And your name, ma'am?

You are here to seek the approval of the

court to settle a claim of your minor child?

12

MRS. ATKINSON:

13

THE COURT:

14

MRS. ATKINSON:

15

THE COURT:

16

MRS. ATKINSON:

17

THE COURT:

18

Polly Atkinson.

Yes, sir.

And this is the child here?
Uh huh.

And you are the mother of the child?
Yes, sir.

And the gentleman holding the child is your

husband and the child's father; is that correct?

19

MRS. ATKINSON:

20

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you believe you have a claim against

21

Intermountain Health Care?

22

MRS. ATKINSON:

23

THE COURT:

24

MRS. ATKINSON:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

What's the nature of the child's injury?
Brain damage.

Do you understand that by settling this

case, and regardless of what later transpires, when you find
out later that the child's injury is worse than you anticipated f and on the other hand even if it's better, that you
will not ever be able to come back against Intermountain
5

Health Care?

Do you understand that?

t>

MRS. ATKINSON:

7

THE COURT:

e
9
10

Yes, sir, I do.

Have you sought the advice of legal counsel

in this matter?
MRS, ATKINSON:

I 'have talked to someone about it, but

we are not planning on getting a lawyer.

ii

THE COURT:

12

MRS. ATKINSON:

Have you talked to a lawyer?
Yes.

I've just asked him a few things

13

about it, and he said that we really should not — we

14

shouldn't have to sue them if they are giving us an offer.

15
16
17
18
19
20

THE COURT:

Well, what's your understanding of the

offer?
MRS. ATKINSON:

medical, financial, his education.
THE COURT:

Do you understand that this provides for

monthly payments?

21

MRS. ATKINSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

That he would be taken care of both

Yes, I do.

Do you understand that it will be —

will get $500 per month, or $6,000 a year?

24

MRS. ATKINSON:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, sir, I do.

What about a bond, Mr. Morgan?
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CONTRACT BETWEEN IHC AND WETZEL SERVICES, INC.

A GRE E M E N T

AGREEMENT, made and entered into this
/p -~~ day of
77k^^, Lf__
19fi^, by and between Intermountaln Health Care, Inc.,
a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as flIHCM) with its
principal place of business at 36 South State Street, Floor 22,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.,, a
Washington corporation (hereinafter referred to as "SWS'1) with
its principal place of business at 500 Pacific Avenue, Bremerton,
Washington 98310:
TT T

U

WHEREAS, IHC maintains a self-insured plan to cover its
general and professional liability (malpractice) and workers1
compensation exposures; and SWS has agreed to perform certain
services in connection therewith, as herein set: forth:
NOW, THEREFORE, I t I s agreed as fol 1 ows:
1.

"This Agreement shall
shall remain in full
terminated by either
days written advance
party

become effective January 1, 1 981 , ai id
force and effect indefinitely until
party giving not less than sixty (60)
notice of such termination to the other

2,

During the period or periods of this Agreement, SWS shall
represent and act for IHC in matters pertaining to the general, professional, and workersf compensation liabilities
of IHC for claims based on events which occur during the
term or terms of this Agreement. During the term hereof,
SWS shall devote its best efforts in the conduct of its
duties hereunder, Such duties shall be the following:
(a)

Receive notice of and create files on each claim
reported and maintain these files for IHC,

(b)

Invest! gate all claims as required to determine their
validl ty and compensability to negotiate and close
settlements wherever possible.

(c)

Determine proper benefits and relalvil i-spiii1 "".. iln > r.
compensable cases.

Cd)

Make timely payment of benefits due and other claim
expenses, in accord with payment procedures as established from funds provided by IHC. IHC will be wholly
•responsible for providing such funds as may be required
for these payments.

{(j)

Prepare documentation and defense of cases considered
non-compensable, represent IHC at State and Federal
agencies, and assist selected legal counsel in preparation of cases for hearings, appeals, and/or trial.

(f)

Maintain and provide IHC pertinent data c ri a 1 3 :::] an in
and expense payments

(g)

Provide monthly and/or quarterly computerized loss reports in a tailored format, as mutually agreed at inception of the program, showing descriptive data, details
of each month's payments, total payments, reserves and
total experience for each claim,

(h)

Provide excess insurers
may reasonably require.

(i)

Provide information and assistance as may be required
for preparation and filing of all reports required by
State and Federal agencies in connection with IHC f s
approved self-insured status. This provision assumes
IHC will report workers' compensation cases to SWS in
compliance with state law.

( ])

File with appropriate governmental agencies sue-, i: . rmation as is required on each claim.

T

^ reports as they

SWS will be responsible for handling all general and professional liability claims within the metropolitan zone (defined
as Salt Lake and Weber Counties), IHC will be responsible
for handling all liability claims outside the metropolitan
zone, but may assign these claims to SWS as desired. Any
such claims assigned to SWS will be charged at the rates outlined in paragraph four (4) of the Agreement.
In consideration of the service u; e performed by SWS hereunder, IHC shall pay to SWS a fee of sixty dollars ($60) per
workers' compensation claim and three hundred fifty dollars
($350) per liability claim. There will be a minimum annual
fee of ninety-six thousand, dollars ($96,000), to be paid in
equal monthly payments.
Billing for claims over and above the minimum annual fee will
be submitted based upon the cumulative claim count as required
by section 2(g) of the Agreement
Actual travel expenses for any general and professional liability claim requiring travel outside the metropolitan zone
will be reimbursed to SWS.
Attorneys 1 fees, court and/or hearing costs, costs of depositions, documents and exhibits, witness and expert fees, medical and engineering appraisal, surveillance, photography
and other incidental and special costs incurred to evaluate
compensability of claims shall be at the expense of IHC.

6

All claims and related files generated by SWS as a result of
its activity under this plan shall remain at all times the
property of IHC with the exception of any supporting data
required by SWS to make such accountings to IHC or excess
insurers as are required I n this Agreement.
SWS is retained by IHC only for the purposes and to the
extent set forth in this Agreement, and its relationship
to IHC shall be t! lat: of an I ndependent contractor.

8.

IHC agrees during the term of this Agreement and for a period
of one (1) year following its termination it will not employ
any person employed by SWS during the term,, of thl s Agreement
without the written consent of SWS,

9.

IHC agrees to indemnify and to hold SWS harmless from and
against any and all claims, actions, expense, losses, liabilities, damages, penalties, costs, and demand whatsoever,
together with counsel fees and expenses arising out of the
business conducted by IHC and which are occasioned by IHCfs
failure to perform according to this Agreement.

10.

SWS agrees to indemnify and to hold IHC harmless from and
against any and all claims, actions, expense, losses, liabilities, damages, penalties, costs and demand whatsoever,
together with counsel fees and expenses, arising out of
activities of SWS and which are occasioned by the negligent
or intentional acts, or omissions, of SWS.

11.

Any notice required or perinitted to be given under this
Agreement shall be sufficient if given in writing and sent
by registered or certified mail to IHC or to SWS at the
addresses first set forth above or to any other address cf
which written notice of change is given.

12.

The waiver by SWS .. . ^HC of the breach of any provision of
this Agreement by the other party shall not operate or be
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach by either
party or prevent either party thereafter enforcing any such
provision.

13.

Upon termination of this Agreement SWS shall, at IKCf s option,
continue to supervise and report to IHC on all claims based
• on events which occurred during the terms of the Agreement
prior to its termination, until such tine as the disposition
of such claims is completed

14.

This Agreement sets forth all of the terms., conditions, and
agreements of the parties relative to the subject matter
hereof and supersedes any and all former agreements with
respect thereto; and any and all such former agreements are •
hereby declared terminated and of no further force and effect
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upon the execution and delivery hereof. There are no terms,
conditions, or agreements with respect thereto, except as
herein provided and no amendment or modification of this
Agreement shall be effective unless reduced to writing and
executed by the parties.
15.

Governing Law: The construction, interpretation, and performance of~Th is contract and all transactions under it
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement as of the date first above written.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
ATTEST-:

-•- *J^4Cv
Title
SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC.
ATTEST:
L^M/ll

CL^ft-7

Title

Vice President

V

The Agreement effective January 1, 1981 by and between
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Scott Wetzel Services,
Inc. (SWS) to v;hich this Amendment is attached is by this
instrument modified as fellows, effective July 1, 1982:
1. Paragraph 2 (i). Delete the last sentence, which
reads, ''This prevision assumes IKC will report
Workers' Compensation cases to SWS in compliance
with state law."
Substitute the following paragraph, "At IHCfs
option these Workers' Compensation claims having
a total compensable value under One Hundred Dollars
($100) may be self-administered by IHC. Such selfadministered claims will be directly reported to
the state authorities by IHC and not through SWS.
IHC will be responsible for compliance with state,
federal, and local law in the processing of selfadministered claims. All other Workers' Compensation claims will be reported to SWS for handling."
2. Paragraph 2 (j). Delete the existing sentence.
Substitute, "File with appropriate governmental
agencies such information as required on each claim
processed by SWS.
3. Paragraph 4. The prior paragraph will remain in
effect through June 30, 1982. For claims reported
to SWS after June 30, 1982, IHC shall pay to"SWS a
fee of Ninety Dollars ($90) per Workers' Compensation claim and Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350)
per Liability claim. There will be a minimum annual
fee of Eighty Four Thousand Dollars ($84,000) to be
paid in equal monthly installments, effective
July 1, 1982. The combined minimum fee for 1982 is
Ninety thousand Dollars ($90,000). The first six
months is Forty Eight Thousand Dollars ($48,000),
the second six months Forty Two Thousand Dollars
($42,000). The second and third paragraphs of
Paragraph 4 remain in effect.
It is further agreed that a value of Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000) is to be placed upon past and
future work done by IHC on pre-1981 Liability
claims. This work was performed after December 31, 1980
by IHC. SWS will credit IHC Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000) for this work.

Pace 2

amendment

4. Paragraph 13. Add the following, "This paragraph
applies only to those claims reported to and
processed by SWS under this Agreement."
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Aareement.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
Date

•As v/*,

>

/

Sianed:
Bv:

tffa

ATTEST:

Sidney 6. 7&
/Garrett

Title:

^.r^

Vice President

SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES,
Date

INC,

Signed:

9TU/IA

/f^2-

By:

Title: Executive Vice President

ATTEST:

v

19J

44L

/

A M E N D M E N T

This agreement effective January 1, 1981 and subsequently amended through a
transmittal letter, an amendment dated March 19, 1982 by and between Intermountain Health Care, Inc., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as
IHC) with its principal place of business at 36 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, and Scott Wetzel Services Inc., a Washington corporation (hereinafter referred to as SWS), with its principal place of business
at 500 Pacific Avenue, Bremerton, Washington 98310, herewith agree to the
modification listed below, to be effective on a retroactive basis to
January 1, 1983.
Paragraph four originally called for a minimum annual fee of $96,000, to be
paid in equal monthly payments. Through the aforementioned amendment, the
nimimum annual fee to be reduced to $84,000, to be paid in equal monthly
installments, effective July 1, 1982. Effective January 1, 1983, the minimum
annual fee is reduced to $70,000, payable in equal monthly payments. It is
agreed that appropriate adjustments in billings will reflect the new terms
and conditions outlined in this amendment.

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
ATTEST*

Title

SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC.
ATTEST:

GlM* fiuJlii

-^U

By_
Title

Executive Vice President

*M*

